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Abstract
We study the efficiency of the proportional allocation mechanism that is widely used to al-
locate divisible resources. Each agent submits a bid for each divisible resource and receives a
fraction proportional to her bids. We quantify the inefficiency of Nash equilibria by studying
the Price of Anarchy (PoA) of the induced game under complete and incomplete information.
When agents’ valuations are concave, we show that the Bayesian Nash equilibria can be arbi-
trarily inefficient, in contrast to the well-known 4/3 bound for pure equilibria [16]. Next, we
upper bound the PoA over Bayesian equilibria by 2 when agents’ valuations are subadditive,
generalizing and strengthening previous bounds on lattice submodular valuations. Furthermore,
we show that this bound is tight and cannot be improved by any simple or scale-free mechanism.
Then we switch to settings with budget constraints, and we show an improved upper bound on
the PoA over coarse-correlated equilibria. Finally, we prove that the PoA is exactly 2 for pure
equilibria in the polyhedral environment.
1 Introduction
Allocating network resources, like bandwidth, among agents is a canonical problem in the network
optimization literature. A traditional model for this problem was proposed by Kelly [18], where
allocating these infinitely divisible resources is treated as a market with prices. More precisely,
agents in the system submit bids on resources to express their willingness to pay. After soliciting
the bids, the system manager prices each resource and then agents buy portions of resources by
paying a proportional amount of the prices. The users act as price takers, trying to maximize
their utility, i.e. the difference between their valuations and payments, and they do not anticipate
the effect of their actions on the prices. Kelly [18] showed that, under certain assumptions, the
aggregate utility of the users is maximized when the players receive portions of the resources that
are proportional to their bids. In the case of a single resource, each user receives a fraction of the
resource equal to the ratio of their bid over the sum of all bids; additionally, they should pay an
amount equal to their own bid. This is known as the proportional allocation mechanism or Kelly’s
mechanism in the literature. It is widely used in network pricing and has been implemented for
allocating computing resources in several distributed systems [8].
Johari and Tsitsiklis [16] relaxed the assumption that the users act as price takers and instead
they can anticipate the effects of their actions on the prices of the resources. They observed that
this strategic bidding in the proportional allocation mechanism leads to inefficient allocations that
do not maximize social welfare. On the other hand, they showed that this efficiency loss is bounded
when agents’ valuations are concave. More specifically, they proved that the proportional allocation
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mechanism admits a unique pure Nash equilibrium with Price of Anarchy (PoA) [19] at most 4/3.
The inefficiency of equilibria has been also observed in other network games such as routing games
[19], routing traffic games [25], congestion games [24] and network design games [1, 4] .
An essential assumption used by Johari and Tsitsiklis [16] is that agents have complete informa-
tion of each other’s valuations. However, in many realistic scenarios, the agents are only partially
informed. A standard way to model incomplete information is by using the Bayesian framework,
where the agents’ valuations are drawn independently from some publicly known distribution that,
in a sense, represents the agents’ beliefs. A natural question is whether the efficiency loss is still
bounded in the Bayesian setting. We give a negative answer to this question by showing that the
PoA over Bayesian equilibria is at least
√
m/2, where m is the number of resources. This result
complements the recent study by Caragiannis and Voudouris [3], where the PoA of single-resource
proportional allocation games is shown to be at most 2 in the Bayesian setting.
Non-concave valuation functions were studied by Syrgkanis and Tardos [26] for both com-
plete and incomplete information games. They showed that, when agents’ valuations are lattice-
submodular, the PoA for coarse correlated and Bayesian Nash equilibria is at most 3.73 by applying
their general smoothness framework. In this paper, we study subadditive valuations [12] that is a
superclass of lattice submodular functions. We prove that the PoA over Bayesian Nash equilibria
is at most 2. Moreover, we show optimality of the proportional allocation mechanism by showing
that this bound is tight and cannot be improved by any simple mechanism, as defined in the recent
framework of Roughgarden [23]1, or any scale-free mechanism2.
Next, we switch to the setting where agents are constrained by budgets that represent the
maximum payment they can afford. We use as a benchmark the effective welfare [26, 3, 10], capping
the contribution of each player to the welfare by their budget (in [10], they called it liquid welfare).
This is a natural benchmark that takes budgets into account, since the participants’ bidding power
is restricted by their budgets3. We compare the effective welfare of the allocation at equilibrium
with the optimal effective welfare. We prove that the PoA of the proportional allocation mechanism
for coarse correlated equilibria is at most 1+φ ≈ 2.618, where φ is the golden ratio. The previously
best known bound was 2.78 for a single resource and concave valuations due to [3].
Finally, we consider the polyhedral environment that was previously studied by Nguyen and
Tardos in [20]. In the polyhedral environment, there exists a collection of resources and the goal is
to associate each agent with a single value, representing their level of activity. Nguyen and Tardos
[20] proved that pure equilibria are at least 75% efficient with concave valuations. We prove that
the PoA is exactly 2 for agents with subadditive valuations. An extended abstract of the current
paper appears in [7].
Related Work. The efficiency of the proportional allocation mechanism has been extensively
studied in the literature of network resource allocation. Besides the work mentioned above, Johari
and Tsitsiklis [17] studied a more general class of scalar-parametrized mechanisms and proved that
the proportional allocation mechanism achieves the best PoA when the mechanism only chooses a
single price. Zhang [27] and Feldman et al. [14] studied the efficiency and fairness of the proportional
1In a simple mechanism, the agents’ action space should be at most sub-doubly-exponential in m.
2The basic property of a scale-free mechanism is that, if every bid is scaled by the same constant, the outcome
remains unchanged (we refer the reader to Section 4.3 for the complete definition).
3We illustrate the weakness of social welfare as a benchmark in the model with budgets by giving the following
example. Consider a single resource and two players with valuations hx1 and x2, where x1 and x2 are the fractions
allocated to player 1 and 2, respectively; h > 1 is an arbitrarily high real value. The players’ budgets are 1/h2 and 1,
respectively. It is not hard to see that if player 1 bids b1, player 2’s best response is b2 =
√
b1− b1. Therefore, for any
pure Nash equilibrium (b1, b2) the social welfare is at most
hb1
b1+b2
+ 1 = h
√
b1 + 1 ≤ 2, where for the last inequality we
used the fact that player 1’s bid cannot exceed her budget, i.e., b1 ≤ 1/h2. The maximum social welfare is h, where
player 1 is allocated the whole resource, which can be arbitrarily higher than the social welfare in the equilibrium.
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allocation mechanism when agents aim at maximizing non quasi-linear utilities subject to budget
constraints. Correa, Schulz and Stier-Moses [9] showed a relationship in the efficiency loss between
the proportional allocation mechanism and non-atomic selfish routing for not necessarily concave
valuation functions.
There is a line of research studying the PoA of simple auctions for selling indivisible goods (see
[2, 5, 15, 26]). Recently, Feldman et al. [13] showed tighter upper bounds for simultaneous first
and second price auctions when the agents have subadditive valuations. Christodoulou et al. [6]
showed matching lower bounds for simultaneous first price auctions, and Roughgarden [23] proved
general lower bounds for the PoA of all simple auctions by using the corresponding computational
or communication lower bounds of the underlying allocation problem.
2 Preliminaries
There are n agents who compete for m divisible resources with unit supply. Every agent i ∈ [n]
has a valuation function, vi : [0, 1]
m → R+, where [n] denotes the set {1, 2, . . . , n}. The valuations
are monotonically non-decreasing, that is, for every two allocations, xi, x
′
i ∈ [0, 1]m, where xi =
(xi1, . . . , xim), x
′
i = (x
′
i1, . . . , x
′
im) and ∀j ∈ [m] xij ≤ x′ij , we have vi(xi) ≤ vi(x′i). We further
assume that the valuations are normalized as vi((0, . . . , 0)) = 0.
In the following definition of the subadditive valuations, for any two allocation vectors x, y ∈
[0, 1]m, we denote the componentwise sum of x and y by x+ y.
Definition 1. A function v : [0, 1]m → R≥0 is subadditive if, for all x, y ∈ [0, 1]m, such that
x+ y ∈ [0, 1]m, it is v(x+ y) ≤ v(x) + v(y).
Remark 2. Lattice submodular functions used in [26] are subadditive (see Section 4). In the case
of a single variable (single resource), any concave function is subadditive; more precisely, concave
functions are equivalent to lattice submodular functions in this case. However, concave functions
of many variables may not be subadditive [22].
In the Bayesian setting, the valuation of each agent i is drawn from a set of possible valuations
Vi, according to some known probability distribution Di. We assume that Di’s are independent,
but not necessarily identical over the agents.
A mechanism takes the agents’ bids/strategies b = (b1, . . . , bn) as input and outputs a tu-
ple (x,q), where x = x(b) = (x1, . . . , xn) specifies the allocation of resources and q = q(b) =
(q1, . . . , qn) specifies the agents’ payments. For every i, xi = (xi1, . . . , xim) = (xij)j denotes the
allocation to agent i, where xij is her allocation for recourse j, and qi is a real value. Every
agent i submits a non-negative bid bij for each resource j, i.e. bi = (bi1, . . . , bim) is a vector. By
b−i = (b1, . . . , bi−1, bi+1, . . . , bn) we denote the strategies of all agents except for i. We represent the
valuations of all agents by the vector v = v(x) = (v1(x1), . . . , vn(xn)), and occasionally, instead of
vi(xi) we may use the notation vi(x), which represents agent i’s valuation under the allocation x.
The utility ui of agent i is defined as the difference between her valuation for the received allocation
and her payment: ui(x(b),q(b)) = ui(b) = vi(xi(b))− qi(b). In the Bayesian setting, we use the
notation uvii in order to specify that vi is the valuation function of agent i.
The proportional allocation mechanism determines the allocation and payment for each agent
i as xij =
bij∑
k∈[n] bkj
and qi =
∑
j∈[m] bij . When all agents bid 0, the allocation can be defined
arbitrarily, but consistently.
Nash Equilibrium. We use b to denote a pure strategy profile; in a more general context,
we denote a strategy profile as B = (B1, . . . , Bn), where Bi is a probability distribution over all
possible pure strategies of agent i. In each one of the following lines, a strategy profile B forms the
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equilibrium notion on the left, if for every agent i and all bids b′i it satisfies the inequality on the
right:
Pure Nash equilibrium: B chooses b with probability 1, ui(b) ≥ ui(b′i,b−i).
Mixed Nash equilibrium: B = ×iBi, Eb∼B[ui(b)] ≥ Eb−i∼B−i [ui(b′i,b−i)].
Correlated equilibrium: B = (Bi)i, Eb∼B[ui(b)|bi] ≥ Eb−i∼B−i [ui(b′i,b−i)|bi].
Coarse correlated equilibrium: B = (Bi)i, Eb∼B[ui(b)] ≥ Eb−i∼B−i [ui(b′i,b−i)].
Bayesian Nash equilibrium: B(v) = ×iBi(vi), Ev−i,b[uvii (b)] ≥ Ev−i,b−i [ui(b′i,b−i)], ∀vi ∈ Vi.
The first four classes of equilibria are in increasing order of inclusion. Moreover, any mixed
Nash equilibrium is also a Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
Price of Anarchy (PoA). Our global objective is to maximize the sum of the agents’ val-
uations for their received allocations, i.e., to maximize the social welfare SW(x) =
∑
i∈[n] vi(xi).
Given the valuations, v, of all agents, there exists an optimal allocation ov = o = (o1, . . . , on), such
that SW(o) = maxx SW(x). By oi = (oi1, . . . , oim) we denote the optimal allocation to agent i.
For simplicity, we use SW(b) and vi(b) instead of SW(x(b)) and vi(xi(b)) whenever the allocation
rule x is clear from the context. We also use shorter notation for expectations, e.g., we use Ev
instead of Ev∼D, E[ui(b)] instead of Eb∼B[ui(b)] and u(B) instead of Eb∼B[u(b)] whenever D and
B are clear from the context.
Definition 3. Let I([n], [m],v) be the set of all instances, i.e., I([n], [m],v) includes the instances
for every set of agents and resources and any possible valuations that the agents might have for the
resources. We define the pure, mixed, correlated, coarse correlated and Bayesian Price of Anarchy
as
PoA = max
I∈I
max
B∈E(I)
Ev[SW(o)]
Ev,b∼B[SW(b)]
,
where E(I) is the set of pure Nash, mixed Nash, correlated, coarse correlated or Bayesian Nash
equilibria for the specific instance I ∈ I, respectively4.
Budget Constraints. We also consider the setting where agents are budget-constrained. That
is, the payment of each agent i cannot be higher than ci, where ci is a non-negative value denoting
agent i’s budget. Following [26, 3, 10], we use Effective Welfare as the benchmark: EW(x) =∑
i min{vi(xi), ci}. In addition, for any randomized allocation x, the expected effective welfare
is defined as: Ex[EW(x)] =
∑
i min{Ex[vi(xi)], ci} and in the Bayesian setting Ev[EW(x(v))] =∑
i Evi,ci min{Ev−i,c−i [vi(xi(v))], ci}.
3 Concave Valuations
In this section, we show that, for concave valuations on multiple resources, Bayesian equilibria can
be arbitrarily inefficient. More precisely, we prove that the Bayesian PoA is Ω(
√
m) in contrast to
the constant bound for pure equilibria [16]. Therefore, there is a big gap between complete and
incomplete information settings. We state our main theorem in this section as follows.
Theorem 4. When valuations are concave the PoA of the proportional allocation mechanism for
Bayesian equilibria is at least
√
m
2 .
Proof. We consider an instance with m resources and 2 agents with the following concave valuations.
v1(x) = minj{x1j} and v2(x) is drawn from a distribution D2, such that some resource j ∈ [m]
is chosen uniformly at random and then v2(x) = x2j/
√
m. Let δ = 1/(
√
m + 1)2. We claim that
4The expectation over v is only needed for the definition of Bayesian PoA.
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b(v) = (b1, b2(v2)) is a pure Bayesian Nash equilibrium, where ∀j ∈ [m], b1j =
√
δ/m− δ and, for
j∗ being the resource chosen by D2, b2j∗(v2) = δ whereas, for all j 6= j∗, b2j = 0.
Under this bidding profile, agent 1 bids the same value for all resources and agent 2 only bids
positive value for a single resource associated with her valuation. Suppose that agent 2 has positive
valuation for resource j, i.e., v2(x) = x2j/
√
m. Then, the rest m−1 resources are allocated to agent
1 and agents are competing for resource j. Bidder 2 has no reason to bid positively for any other
resource. If she bids any value b′2j for resource j, her utility would be u2(b1, b
′
2j) =
1√
m
b′2j
b1j+b′2j
− b′2j ,
which is maximized for b′2j =
√
b1j√
m
− b1j . For b1j =
√
δ/m− δ, the utility of agent 2 is maximized
for b′2j = 1/(
√
m+ 1)2 = δ by simple calculations.
Since v1(x) equals the minimum of x’s components, agent 1’s valuation is completely deter-
mined by the allocation of resource j. So the expected utility of agent 1 under b is Ev2 [u1(b)] =√
δ/m−δ√
δ/m−δ+δ −m(
√
δ/m − δ) = (1 −√mδ)2 = 1
(
√
m+1)
2 = δ. Suppose now that agent 1 deviates to
b′1 = (b′11, . . . , b′1m).
E
v2
[u1(b
′
1, b2)] =
1
m
∑
j
b′1j
b′1j + δ
−
∑
j
b′1j =
1
m
∑
j
(
b′1j
b′1j + δ
−m · b′1j
)
≤ 1
m
∑
j
(√
δ/m− δ√
δ/m
−m · (
√
δ/m− δ)
)
=
1
m
∑
j
(
1− 2
√
m · δ +m · δ
)
=
1
m
∑
j
(
1−
√
m · δ
)2
=
1
m
∑
j
(
1√
m+ 1
)2
= δ = E
v2
[u1(b)].
The inequality comes from the fact that
b′1j
b′1j+δ
−m · b′1j is maximized for b′1j =
√
δ/m − δ. So we
conclude that b is a Bayesian equilibrium.
Finally, we compute the PoA. The expected social welfare under b is Ev2 [SW(b)] =
√
δ/m−δ√
δ/m−δ+δ +
1√
m
δ√
δ/m−δ+δ = 1 −
√
mδ +
√
δ = 2√
m+1
< 2√
m
. The optimal social welfare is 1 by allocating to
agent 1 all resources. So, PoA ≥
√
m
2 .
4 Subadditive Valuations
In this section, we focus on agents with subadditive valuations. We prove that the proportional
allocation mechanism is at least 50% efficient for coarse correlated equilibria and Bayesian Nash
equilibria, i.e., PoA ≤ 2. We further show that this bound is tight and cannot be improved by
any simple or scale-free mechanism. Before proving our PoA bounds, we show that the class of
subadditive functions is a superclass of lattice submodular functions.
Proposition 5. Any lattice submodular function v defined on [0, 1]m is subadditive.
Proof. It has been shown in [26] that, for any lattice submodular function v(x), ∂
2v(x)
(∂xj)2
≤ 0 and
∂2v(x)
∂xj∂xj′
≤ 0. So, the function ∂v∂xj (x) is non-increasing monotone for each coordinate xj′ . It suffices
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to prove that for any x,y ∈ [0, 1]m, v(x+y)−v(y) ≤ v(x)−v(0). Let zk be the vector that zkj = yj
if j ≤ k and xj + yj otherwise. Note that z0 = x + y and zm = y. Similarly, we define wk to be
the vector that wkj = 0 if j ≤ k and xj otherwise. It is easy to see that zk ≥ wk for all k ∈ [m].
So, we have
v(x + y)− v(y) =
∑
j∈[m]
v(zj−1)− v(zj) =
∑
j∈[m]
∫ xj+yj
yj
∂v
∂xj
(tj ; z
j
−j)dtj
≤
∑
j∈[m]
∫ xj+yj
yj
∂v
∂xj
(tj − yj ; zj−j)dtj ≤
∑
j∈[m]
∫ xj
0
∂v
∂xj
(sj ; w
j
−j)dsj = v(x)− v(0).
The second equality is due to the definition of partial derivative and the inequalities is due to the
monotonicity of ∂v∂xj (x).
4.1 Upper bound
A common approach to prove PoA upper bounds is to find a deviation with proper utility bounds
and then use the definition of Nash equilibrium to bound agents’ utilities at equilibrium. The
bidding strategy described in the following lemma is for this purpose.
Lemma 6. Let v be any subadditive valuation profile and B be some randomized bidding profile.
For any agent i, there exists a randomized bidding strategy, ai(v,B−i), such that:∑
i
ui(ai(v,B−i),B−i) ≥ 1
2
∑
i
vi(o
v
i )−
∑
i
∑
j
E
b∼B
[bij ].
Proof. Let pij be the sum of the bids of all agents except i on resource j, i.e., pij =
∑
k 6=i bkj . Note
that pij is a random variable that depends on b−i ∼ B−i. Let Pi be the propability distribution
of pi = (pij)j . Inspired by [13], we consider the bidding strategy ai(v,B−i) = (ovij · b′ij)j , where
b′i ∼ Pi. Then, ui(ai(v,B−i),B−i) is
E
b′i∼Pi
E
pi∼Pi
vi
( ovijb′ij
ovijb
′
ij + pij
)
j
− ovi · b′i

≥1
2
· E
pi∼Pi
E
b′i∼Pi
vi
( ovijb′ij
ovijb
′
ij + pij
+
ovijpij
ovijpij + b
′
ij
)
j
− E
pi∼Pi
[ovi · pi]
≥1
2
· E
pi∼Pi
E
b′i∼Pi
vi
(ovij(b′ij + pij)
b′ij + pij
)
j
− E
pi∼Pi
[ovi · pi]
=
1
2
· vi(ovi )−
∑
j
∑
k 6=i
E
b∼B
[ovij · bkj ]
=
1
2
· vi(ovi )−
∑
j
ovij
∑
k 6=i
E
b∼B
[bkj ]
≥1
2
· vi(ovi )−
∑
j
ovij
∑
k∈[n]
E
b∼B
[bkj ].
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The first inequality follows by swapping pij and b
′
ij and using the subadditivity of vi. The second
inequality comes from the fact that ovij ≤ 1. The lemma follows by summing up over all agents and
the fact that
∑
i∈[n] o
v
ij = 1.
Theorem 7. The coarse correlated PoA of the proportional allocation mechanism with subadditive
agents is at most 2.
Proof. Let B be any coarse correlated equilibrium (note that v is fixed). By Lemma 6 and the
definition of the coarse correlated equilibrium we have∑
i
ui(B) ≥
∑
i
ui(ai(v,B−i),B−i) ≥ 1
2
∑
i
vi(oi)−
∑
i
∑
j
E[bij ].
By rearranging terms, SW(B) =
∑
i ui(B) +
∑
i
∑
j E[bij ] ≥ 12 · SW(o).
Theorem 8. The Bayesian PoA of the proportional allocation mechanism with subadditive agents
is at most 2.
Proof. Let B be any Bayesian Nash Equilibrium and let vi ∼ Di be the valuation of each agent
i drawn independently from Di. We denote by C = (C1, C2, . . . , Cn) the bidding distribution in
B which includes the randomness of both the bidding strategy b and of the valuations v. The
utility of agent i with valuation vi can be expressed by ui(Bi(vi),C−i). It should be noted that
C−i does not depend on some particular v−i, but merely on D−i and B−i. For any agent i and
any subadditive valuation vi ∈ Vi, consider the deviation ai(vi; w−i,C−i) as defined in Lemma 6,
where w−i ∼ D−i. By the definition of the Bayesian Nash equilibrium we obtain
E
v−i
[uvii (Bi(vi),B−i(v−i))] = u
vi
i (Bi(vi),C−i) ≥ Ew−i[u
vi
i (ai(vi; w−i,C−i),C−i)].
By taking expectation over vi and summing up over all agents∑
i
E
v
[ui(B(v))] ≥
∑
i
E
vi,w−i
[uvii (ai(vi; w−i,C−i),C−i)]
=E
v
[∑
i
uvii (ai(v,C−i),C−i)
]
≥ 1
2
·
∑
i
E
v
[vi(o
v
i )]−
∑
i
∑
j
E[bij ].
So, Ev[SW(B(v))] =
∑
i Ev[ui(B(v))] +
∑
i
∑
j E[bij ] ≥ 12 · Ev[SW(ov)].
As we show next, the previous upper bounds of Theorems 7 and 8 are tight even for the pure
Nash equilibrium and a single resource.
Theorem 9. The pure PoA of the proportional allocation mechanism with subadditive agents is
at least 2.
Proof. We consider a game with only two agents and a single resource. The valuation of the first
agent is v1(x) = 1 +  · x, for some  < 1, if x < 1 and v1(x) = 2 if x = 1. The valuation of the
second agent is  ·x. One can easily verify that these two functions are subadditive and the optimal
social welfare is 2. Consider the bidding strategies b1 = b2 =

4 . The utility of agent 1, when she
bids b′1 and agent 2 bids

4 , is given by 1 +  ·
b′1
b′1+/4
− b′1, which is maximized for b′1 = 4 . The
utility of agent 2, when she bids b′2 and agent 1 bids

4 , is  ·
b′2
b′2+/4
− b′2, which is also maximized
when b′2 =

4 . So (b1, b2) is a pure Nash Equilibrium with social welfare 1 + . Therefore, the PoA
converges to 2 when  goes to 0.
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4.2 Simple mechanisms lower bound
Now we show a lower bound that applies to all simple mechanisms, where the bidding space has
size (at most) sub-doubly-exponential in m. More specifically, we apply the general framework of
Roughgarden [23] for showing lower bounds on the price of anarchy for all simple mechanisms via
communication complexity reductions with respect to the underlying optimization problem. In our
setting, the problem is to maximize the social welfare by allocating divisible resources to agents
with subadditive valuations. We proceed by proving a communication lower bound for this problem
in the following lemma.
Lemma 10. For any constant ε > 0, any (2− ε)-approximation (non-deterministic) algorithm for
maximizing social welfare in resource allocation problem with subadditive valuations requires an
exponential amount of communication.
Proof. We prove this lemma by reducing the communication lower bound for combinatorial auc-
tions with general valuations (Theorem 3 of [21]) to our setting (see also [11] for a reduction to
combinatorial auctions with subadditive agents).
Nisan [21] used an instance with n players and m items, with n < m1/2−ε. Each player i is
associated with a set Ti, with |Ti| = t for some t > 0. At every instance of this problem, the
players’ valuations are determined by sets Ii of bundles, where Ii ⊆ Ti for every i. Given Ii, player
i’s valuation on some subset S of items is vi(S) = 1, if there exists some R ∈ Ii such that R ⊆ S,
otherwise vi(S) = 0. In [21], it was shown that distinguishing between instances with optimal social
welfare of n and 1 requires t bits of communication. By choosing t exponential in m their theorem
follows.
We prove the lemma by associating any valuation v of the above combinatorial auction problem
to some appropriate subadditive valuation v′ for our setting. For any player i and any fractional
allocation x = (x1, . . . , xm), let Axi = {j|xij > 12}. We define v′i(xi) = vi(Axi) + 1, if xi 6= 0 and
v′i(xi) = 0, otherwise. It is easy to verify that v
′
i is subadditive. Notice that v
′
i(x) = 2 only if there
exists R ∈ Ii such that player i is allocated a fraction higher than 1/2 for every resource in R. The
value 1/2 is chosen such that no two players are assigned more than that fraction from the same
resource. This corresponds to the constraint of an allocation in the combinatorial auction where
no item is allocated to two players.
Therefore, in the divisible goods allocation problem, distinguishing between instances where
the optimal social welfare is 2n and n + 1 is equivalent to distinguishing between instances where
the optimal social welfare is n and 1 in the corresponding combinatorial auction and hence requires
exponential, in m, number of communication bits.
The PoA lower bound follows the general reduction described in [23].
Theorem 11. The PoA of -mixed Nash equilibria5 of every simple mechanism, when agents have
subadditive valuations, is at least 2.
Remark 12. This result holds only for -mixed Nash equilibria. By considering exact Nash equilibria
we show a lower bound for all scale-free mechanisms in the following section.
4.3 Scale-free mechanisms lower bound
Here we prove a tight lower bound for all scale-free mechanisms including the proportional allocation
mechanism. A mechanism (x,q) is said to be scale-free if a) for every agent i, resource j and
5A bidding profile B = ×iBi is called -mixed Nash equilibrium if, for every agent i and all bids b′i, Eb∼B[ui(b)] ≥
Eb∼B[ui(b′i,b−i)]− .
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constant c > 0, xij(c ·bj) = xij(bj); moreover, for a fixed b−i, xji(·) is non-decreasing and positive
whenever bij is positive, b) the payment for agent i depends only on her bids bi = (bij)j and is
equal to
∑
j∈[m] qi(bij), where qi(·) is non-decreasing, continuous, normalized (qi(0) = 0), and there
always exists a bid bij such that qi(bij) > 0.
Theorem 13. The mixed PoA of scale-free mechanisms when agents have subbaditive valuations,
is at least 2.
Proof. Given a mechanism (x,q), we construct an instance with 2 agents and m resources. Let V
be a positive value such that V/m is in the range of both q1 and q2. This can be always done due
to our assumptions on qi. Let T1 and T2 be the values such that q1(T1) = q2(T2) = V/m. W.l.o.g.
we assume that T1 ≥ T2. By monotonicity of q1, q1(T2) ≤ V/m. Pick an arbitrary value a ∈ (0, 1),
and let h1j = x1j(a, a) and h2j = x2j(a, a), for every j ∈ [m]. By the assumption that xij(bj) > 0
for bij > 0 we have h1j,h2j ∈ (0, 1) for all j ∈ [m]. Let v = V/
√
m. We define the agents’ valuations
as:
v1(x) =

0, if ∀j ∈ [m], x1j = 0,
v, if ∀j x1j < h1j , ∃k x1k > 0
2v, otherwise
v2(x) =

0, if ∀j ∈ [m], x1j = 0
V, if ∃j x1j < h2j , ∃k x1k > 0
2V, otherwise
We claim that the following mixed strategy profile B is a Nash equilibrium. Agent 1 picks
resource l uniformly at random and bids b1l = y, and b1j = 0, for j 6= l, where y is a random variable
drawn by the cumulative distribution G(y) = mq2(y)V , y ∈ [0, T2]. Agent 2 bids b2j = z for every
resource j, where z is a random variable drawn from F (z), defined as F (z) = v−q1(T2)+q1(z)v , z ∈
[0, T2]. Recall that v = V/
√
m and q1(T2) ≤ V/m. Therefore, v − q1(T2) ≥ 0 and thus F (0) ≥ 0.
Notice that G(·) and F (·) are valid CDFs, due to monotonicity of qi(·) and also G(T2) = 1,
F (T2) = 1. Since qi(·) is continuous, G(y) and F (y) are continuous in (0,∞) and therefore both
functions have no mass point in any y 6= 0. We assume that if both agents bid 0 for some resource,
agent 2 is allocated the whole resource. We are ready to show that B is a Nash equilibrium. For
the following arguments bare in mind that G(T2) = 1, F (T2) = 1 and G(0) = 0.
If agent 1 bids any y in the range (0, T2] for a single resource j and zero for the rest, then
she gets allocation of at least h1j (that she values for 2v), only if y ≥ z, which happens with
probability F (y). This holds due to monotonicity of x1j(·) with respect to y. Otherwise her value
is v. Therefore, her expected valuation is v+F (y)v. So, for every y ∈ (0, T2] her expected utility is
v+F (y)v− q1(y) = 2v− q1(T2). If agent 1 picks y according to G(y), her utility is still 2v− q1(T2),
since she bids 0 with zero probability. Suppose agent 1 bids y = (y1, . . . , ym), yj ∈ [0, T2] for every
j, with at least two positive bids, and w.l.o.g., assume y1 = maxj yj . If z > y1, agent 1 has value v
for the allocation she receives and if z ≤ y1, agent 1 has value 2v. But in both cases she pays more
than q1(y1) and so, this strategy is dominated by the strategy of bidding y1 for the first resource
and zero for the rest. Bidding greater than T2 for any resource is dominated by the strategy of
bidding exactly T2 for that resource.
If agent 2 bids z ∈ [0, T2] for all resources, she gets an allocation of at least h2j , for every j ∈ [m],
with probability G(z) (due to monotonicity of x2j(·) with respect to z and to the tie breaking rule).
So, her expected utility is V + G(z)V −mq2(z) = V . Bidding greater than T2 for any resource is
dominated by bidding exactly T2 for this resource. Suppose that agent 2 bids any z = (z1, . . . zm),
with zj ∈ [0, T2] for every j, then, since agent 1 bids positively for any resource with probability 1/m,
agent’s 2 expected utility is 1m
∑
j (V +G(zj)V −
∑
k q2(zk)) =
1
m
∑
j (V +mq2(zj)−
∑
k q2(zk)) =
1
m
(
mV +m
∑
j q2(zj)−m
∑
k q2(zk)
)
= V. So, B is Nash equilibrium.
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Therefore, it is sufficient to bound the expected social welfare in B. First notice that the
valuation of agents 1 and 2 are, according to the definition, at most 2v and 2V , respectively.
Agent 1 bids 0 with zero probability, so, with probability 1 if agent 2 bids 0, there exists some
resource j from which she receives a fraction less than h2j . Her valuation in that case is V ,
meaning that in expectation the valuation of agent 2 is at most 2V − F (0) · V . Agent 2 bids 0
with probability F (0) = 1− q1(T2)v ≥ 1− Vmv = 1− 1√m . Hence, E[SW(B)] ≤ 2V − F (0) · V + 2v ≤
2V − V
(
1− 1√
m
)
+ 2V 1√
m
= V
(
1 + 3√
m
)
. On the other hand, the social welfare in the optimum
allocation is 2(V +v) = 2V
(
1 + 1√
m
)
(agent 1 is allocated h1j proportion from some resource j and
the rest is allocated to agent 2). We conclude that PoA ≥ 2
(
1+ 1√
m
)
(
1+ 3√
m
) which, for large m, converges
to 2.
5 Budget Constraints
In this section, we switch to scenarios where agents have budget constraints. We use as a benchmark
the effective welfare similarly to [26, 3, 10]. We compare the effective welfare of the allocation at
equilibrium with the optimal effective welfare. We prove an upper bound of φ+1 ≈ 2.618 for coarse
correlated equilibria when bidders have subadditive valuations and compete for many resources,
where φ =
√
5+1
2 is the golden ratio. This improves the previously known 2.78 upper bound in [3]
for a single resource and concave valuations.
To prove this upper bound we use the fact that in the equilibrium there is no profitable unilateral
deviation and in particular, the utility of agent i obtained by any pure deviating bid ai should be
bounded by her budget ci, i.e.,
∑
j∈[m] aij ≤ ci. We define vc to be the valuation v suppressed by
the budget c, i.e., vc(x) = min{v(x), c}. Note that vc is also subadditive since v is subadditive. For
a fixed pair (v, c), let o = (o1, . . . , on) be the allocation that maximizes the effective welfare. For
a fixed agent i and a vector of bids b−i, we define the vector pi = (pij)j where pij =
∑
k 6=i bkj for
all j ∈ [m]. We first show the existence of a proper deviation.
Lemma 14. For any subadditive agent i, and any randomized bidding profile B, there exists a
randomized bid ai(B−i), such that for any λ ≥ 1, it is
ui(ai(B−i),B−i) ≥ v
ci
i (oi)
λ+ 1
−
∑
j∈[m]
∑
k∈[n] oij E[bkj ]
λ
.
Moreover, for any pure strategy aˆi in the support of ai(B−i),
∑
j aˆij ≤ ci.
Proof. In order to find ai(B−i) we define the truncated bid vector b˜−i as follows. For any set
S ⊆ [m] of resources, we denote by 1S the indicator vector w.r.t. S, such that xj = 1 for j ∈ S
and xj = 0 otherwise. For any vector pi and any λ > 0, let T := T (λ, pi) be a maximal subset of
resources such that, vcii (1T ) <
1
λ
∑
j∈T oijpij . For every k 6= i, if j ∈ T , then b˜kj = 0, otherwise
b˜kj = bkj . Similarly with pi, we define the vector p˜i = (p˜ij)j , where p˜ij =
∑
k 6=i b˜kj for all j ∈ [m].
Moreover, if b−i ∼ B−i, then pi is an induced random variable with distribution denoted by
Pi = {pi|b−i ∼ B−i}. We further define distributions B˜−i and P˜i, as B˜−i = {b˜−i|b−i ∼ B−i} and
P˜i = {p˜i|b˜−i ∼ B˜−i}.
Now consider the following bidding strategy ai(B−i): sampling b′i ∼ P˜i and bidding aij = 1λoijb′ij
for each resource j. We first show
∑
j∈[m] aij ≤ ci. It is sufficient to show that
∑
j /∈T aij ≤
vcii (1[m]\T ) since v
ci
i (1[m]\T ) ≤ ci and
∑
j∈T aij = 0. For the sake of contradiction suppose
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vcii (1[m]\T ) <
∑
j /∈T aij . Then, by the definition of T and p˜i and due to subadditivity v
ci
i (1[m]) ≤
vcii (1T ) + v
ci
i (1[m]\T ) <
1
λ
∑
j∈T oijpij +
∑
j /∈T aij =
1
λ
∑
j∈[m] oijpij , which contradicts the maxi-
mality of T .
Next we show that, for any bid bi and λ > 0,
vcii (xi(bi,B−i)) +
1
λ
∑
j∈[m]
oij E
pi∼Pi
[pij ] ≥ vcii (xi(bi, B˜−i)) +
1
λ
∑
j∈[m]
oij E
p˜i∼P˜i
[p˜ij ]. (1)
Observe that xi(bi, b˜−i) ≤ xi(bi,b−i) + 1T . Therefore, by using the subadditivity of vcii and the
definitions of T and p˜i
vcii (xi(bi, b˜−i)) ≤ vcii (xi(bi,b−i)) + vcii (1T ) ≤ vcii (xi(bi,b−i)) +
1
λ
∑
j∈T
oijpij
= vcii (xi(bi,b−i)) +
1
λ
∑
j∈[m]
oijpij − 1
λ
∑
j∈[m]
oij p˜ij .
The claim follows by rearranging terms and taking the expectation of b−i, b˜−i, pi and p˜i over B−i,
B˜−i, Pi and P˜i, respectively. We next prove the statement of the lemma.
Eb′i∼P˜i
[
ui
(
1
λ
oib
′
i,B−i
)]
= E
b′i∼P˜i
[
vi
(
1
λ
oib
′
i,B−i
)]
− 1
λ
∑
j∈[m]
oij E
b′i∼P˜i
[
b′ij
]
≥ E
b′i∼P˜i
[
vcii
(
1
λ
oib
′
i,B−i
)]
− 1
λ
∑
j∈[m]
oij E
p˜i∼P˜i
[p˜ij ] (by definition of v
ci
i )
≥ E
b′i∼P˜i
[
vcii
(
1
λ
oib
′
i, B˜−i
)]
− 1
λ
∑
j∈[m]
oij E
pi∼Pi
[pij ] (by Inequality (1))
≥ 1
2
E
b′i∼P˜i
E
p˜i∼P˜i
[
vcii
(
oib
′
i
oib′i + λp˜i
+
oip˜i
oip˜i + λb′i
)]
− 1
λ
∑
j∈[m]
oij
∑
k 6=i
E
bkj∼Bkj
[bkj ]
(by swapping b′i with p˜i and the subadditivity of v
ci
i (·))
≥ 1
2
E
b′i∼P˜i
E
p˜i∼P˜i
[
vcii
(
oi
(
b′i
b′i + λp˜i
+
p˜i
p˜i + λb′i
))]
− 1
λ
∑
j∈[m]
oij
∑
k∈[n]
E[bkj ]
≥ 1
2
vcii
(
2oi
λ+ 1
)
− 1
λ
∑
j∈[m]
∑
k∈[n]
oij E[bkj ] (by monotonicity of vcii )
≥ 1
λ+ 1
vcii (oi)−
1
λ
∑
j∈[m]
∑
k∈[n]
oij E[bkj ].
(
subadditivity of vcii ;
2
λ+1 ≤ 1
)
For the second inequality, notice that the second term doesn’t depend on b′i and so, we apply
Inequality (1) for every b′i. For the forth inequality we used the fact that oi ≤ 1 in the first term
and the inequality
∑
k 6=i E[bkj ] ≤
∑
k∈[n] E[bkj ] in the second term. For the fifth inequality, it is not
hard to see that, for every b′i, p˜i and λ ≥ 1, it holds that b
′
i
b′i+λp˜i
+ p˜i
p˜i+λb′i
≥ 2λ+1 .
We are ready to show the PoA bound by using the above lemma.
Theorem 15. The coarse correlated PoA for the proportional allocation mechanism when agents
have budget constraints and subadditive valuations, is at most φ+ 1 ≈ 2.618.
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Proof. Suppose B is a coarse correlated equilibrium. Let A be the set of agents such that for every
i ∈ A, vi(B) ≤ ci. For simplicity, we use vcii (B) to denote min{Eb∼B[vi(xi(b))], ci}. Then for all
i /∈ A, vcii (B) = ci ≥ vcii (oi) and vcii (B) = ci ≥
∑
j∈[m] E[bij ]. The latter inequality comes from that
agents do not bid higher than their budgets. Let λ = φ. So 1 − 1/λ = 1/(1 + λ). By taking the
linear combination and summing up over all agents not in A we get∑
i/∈A
vcii (B) ≥
1
λ+ 1
∑
i/∈A
vcii (oi) +
1
λ
∑
i/∈A
∑
j∈[m]
E[bij ]. (2)
For every i ∈ A, we consider the deviating bidding strategy ai(B−i) that is described in Lemma 14,
then
vcii (B) = vi(xi(B)) = ui(xi(B)) +
∑
j∈[m]
E[bij ] ≥ ui(ai(B−i),B−i) + 1
λ
∑
j∈[m]
E[bij ]
≥ 1
λ+ 1
vcii (oi)−
1
λ
∑
j∈[m]
∑
k∈[n]
oij E[bkj ] +
1
λ
∑
j∈[m]
E[bij ].
By summing up over all i ∈ A and by combining with inequality (2) we get∑
i∈[n]
min{vi(xi(B)), ci}
≥ 1
λ+ 1
∑
i∈[n]
vcii (oi) +
1
λ
∑
i∈[n]
∑
j∈[m]
E[bij ]− 1
λ
∑
i∈A
∑
j∈[m]
∑
k∈[n]
oij E[bkj ]
≥ 1
λ+ 1
∑
i∈[n]
vcii (oi).
(
since
∑
i∈A oij ≤ 1
)
Therefore, the PoA with respect to the effective welfare is at most φ+ 1. (recall that for Inequal-
ity (2) we set λ = φ)
In the Bayesian case we cannot apply the same ideas for subadditive valuations due to the fact
that in the definition of E[EW] the expectation over v−i appears inside the minimum function (see
Section 2). However, by applying Jensen’s inequality for concave functions our upper bound also
holds for the Bayesian case with single-resource and concave valuations. Notice that the lower
bound of Theorem 4 also holds under the restriction of budgets and therefore, we couldn’t expect
the same upper bound for concave valuations and many resources.
Theorem 16. The Bayesian PoA of single-resource proportional allocation games is at most φ+1 ≈
2.618, when agents have budget constraints and concave valuations.
Proof. Suppose B is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Recall that in the Bayesian setting, agent i’s
type ti = (vi, ci) are drawn from some know distribution independently. We use the notation
C = (C1, C2, . . . , Cn) to denote the bidding distribution in B which includes the randomness of
bidding strategy b and agents’ types t, that is, bi(ti) ∼ Ci. Then the utility of agent i with type ti
is ui(Bi(ti),C−i). Notice that C−i does not depend on any particular t−i.
Recall that vc(x) = min{v(x), c}. It is easy to check vc is concave if v is concave. For any agents
types t = (v, c), let ot = (ot1, ..., o
t
n) be the allocation vector that maximizes the effective welfare.
We define otii to be the expected allocation over t−i ∼ D−i to agent i in the optimum solution with
respect to effective welfare when her type is ti. Formally, o
ti
i = Et−i∼D−i [o
(ti,t−i)
i ].
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For every agent i, let Ai be the set of ti such that vi(xi(Bi(ti),C−i)) ≤ ci. For simplicity, we
use vcii (Bi(ti),C−i) to denote min{Et−i,b∼B(t)[vi(xi(b))], ci}. For every ti /∈ Ai, vcii (Bi(ti),C−i) =
ci ≥ min{Et−i [vi(oti )], ci} and vcii (Bi(ti),C−i) = ci ≥ E[bi(ti)]. The latter inequality comes from
the fact that agents do not bid above their budget. Let λ = φ. So 1− 1/λ = 1/(1 + λ). By taking
the linear combination, taking the expectation over all ti /∈ Ai and summing up over all agents we
get ∑
i∈[n]
E
ti /∈Ai
[vcii (Bi(ti),C−i)] ≥
∑
i∈[n]
E
ti /∈Ai
[
1
λ+ 1
min
{
E
t−i
[vi(o
t
i )], ci
}
+
1
λ
E[bi(ti)]
]
. (3)
For every ti ∈ Ai, by Lemma 14, there exists a randomized bid ai(ti,B−i) for agent i, such that,
for any λ ≥ 1: ui(ai(ti,B−i),B−i) ≥ 1λ+1vcii (otii )− 1λotii
∑
k 6=i E[bk]. By the definition of equilibria
vcii (Bi(ti),C−i) = vi(Bi(ti),C−i) = ui(Bi(ti),C−i) + E[bi(ti)]
≥ ui(ai(ti,C−i),C−i) + 1
λ
E[bi(ti)] ≥ 1
λ+ 1
vcii (o
ti
i )−
1
λ
otii
∑
k∈[n]
E[bk] +
1
λ
E[bi(ti)]
≥ 1
λ+ 1
min
{
E
t−i
[vi(o
t
i )], ci
}
− 1
λ
otii
∑
k∈[n]
E[bk] +
1
λ
E[bi(ti)].
The last inequality holds due to Jensen’s inequality for concave functions. By taking the expectation
over all ti ∈ Ai, summing over all agents and combining with inequality (3):∑
i
E
ti
[vcii (Bi(ti),C−i)]
≥ 1
λ+ 1
∑
i
E
ti
[
min
{
E
t−i
[
vi
(
oti
)]
, ci
}]
+
1
λ
∑
i
E[bi]− 1
λ
∑
i
E
ti∈Ai
[
otii
] ∑
k∈[n]
E[bk]
≥ 1
λ+ 1
∑
i
E
ti
[
min
{
E
t−i
[
vi
(
oti
)]
, ci
}]
+
1
λ
∑
i
E[bi]− 1
λ
∑
k∈[n]
E[bk]
=
1
λ+ 1
∑
i
E
ti
[
min
{
E
t−i
[
vi
(
oti
)]
, ci
}]
.
The first inequality is due to that
∑
i Eti
[
otii
]
=
∑
i Et
[
oti
]
= Et
[∑
i o
t
i
] ≤ 1, since for every t,∑
i o
t
i ≤ 1. Therefore, the PoA is at most φ+ 1.
Remark 17. Syrgkanis and Tardos [26] compared the social welfare in the equilibrium with the
effective welfare in the optimum allocation. Caragiannis and Voudouris [3] also give an upper
bound of 2 for this ratio in the single resource case. We can obtain the same upper bound by
replacing λ with 1 in Lemma 14 and following the ideas of Theorems 7 and 8.
6 Polyhedral Environment
In this section, we study the efficiency of the proportional allocation mechanism in the polyhedral
environment, that was previously studied by Nguyen and Tardos [20]. We show a tight price of
anarchy bound of 2 for agents with subadditive valuations. Recall that, in this setting, the allocation
to each agent i is now represented by a single parameter xi, and not by a vector (xi1, . . . , xim).
In addition, any feasible allocation vector x = (x1, . . . , xn) should satisfy a polyhedral constraint
A · x ≤ 1, where A is a non-negative m × n matrix and each row of A corresponds to a different
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resource and 1 is a vector with all ones. Each agent aims to maximize her utility ui = vi(xi)− qi,
where vi is a subadditive function representing the agent’s valuation. The proportional allocation
mechanism determines the following allocation and payments for each agent:
xi(b) = min
j:aij>0
{
bij
aij
∑
k∈[n] bkj
}
; qi(b) =
∑
j∈[m]
bij ,
where aij is the (i, j)-th entry of matrix A. It is easy to verify that the above allocation satisfies
the polyhedral constraints.
Theorem 18. If agents have subadditive valuations, the pure PoA of the proportional allocation
mechanism in the polyhedral environment is exactly 2.
Proof. We first show that the PoA is at most 2. Let o = {o1, . . . , on} be the optimal allocation, b
be a pure Nash Equilibrium, and let pij =
∑
k 6=i bij . For each agent i, consider the deviating bid b
′
i
such that b′ij = oiaijpij for all resources j. Since b is a Nash Equilibrium,
ui(b) ≥ ui(b′i,b−i) = vi
(
min
j:aij>0
{
oiaijpij
aij (pij + oiaijpij)
})
−
∑
j∈[m]
oiaijpij
≥ vi
(oi
2
)
−
∑
j∈[m]
oiaijpij ≥ 1
2
vi(oi)−
∑
j∈[m]
oiaijpij .
The second inequality is true since A · x ≤ 1, for every allocation x, and therefore oiaij < 1. The
last inequality holds due to subadditivity of vi. By summing up over all agents we get∑
i
ui(b) ≥ 1
2
∑
i
vi(oi)−
∑
j∈[m]
∑
i∈[n]
oiaijpij ≥ 1
2
∑
i
vi(oi)−
∑
j∈[m]
∑
k∈[n]
bkj .
The last inequality holds due to the fact that pij ≤
∑
k∈[n] bkj and
∑
i∈[n] oiaij ≤ 1. The fact that
PoA ≤ 2 follows by rearranging the terms.
For the lower bound, consider the lower bound instance of Theorem 9, where the polyhedral
constraint is given by x1 + x2 ≤ 1.
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